

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O R 212013Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1237

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 4497

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, XT, GW

SUBJECT: STATE SECRETARY FRANK COMMENTS ON U.S.

RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WHICH I HAD REQUESTED FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (REPORTED BY SEPTELS), STATE SECRETARY FRANK BROACHED
SUBJECT OF U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. HE

THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO INTRODUCE A BREATHING PERIOD
DURING WHICH THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEANS COULD CONTINUE
THEIR CONVERSATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AIMED AT AGREEMENT
ON DECLARATIONS, WITHOUT FEELING UNDER PRESSURE. FRANK
EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT CLOSE CONSULTATION DURING PERIODS
OF CRISIS WOULD INEVITABLY BE INADEQUATE IN THE ABSENCE OF

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PRIOR AGREEMENT ON A COMMON ANALYSIS OF SITUATIONS

WHERE CRISES MIGHT ARISE. END SUMMARY.

1. FRANK OPENED DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BY ASKING WHETHER WE COULD DISCERN ANY REACTION TO THE FRG'S EFFORTS TO SMOOTH OVER THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE. FRANK THOUGHT THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY MINISTER SCHEEL IN A MARCH 17 INTERVIEW WERE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT -- I.E., THIS WAS NOT A NEW PROBLEM BUT IT WAS VERY SERIOUS. IN ITS SIMPLEST FORM, THE QUESTION TO BE ASKED WAS HOW THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION COULD BE MADE CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN POLICY GOALS; OR, TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, HOW MUCH LEEWAY DID U.S. POLICY ALLOW FOR THE EXPRESSION OF COORDINATED VIEWS BY A EUROPE THAT WAS NOT YET FULLY UNIFIED. FRANK THOUGHT THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THESE MATTERS WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. WITHOUT U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION, EUROPE COULD NOT LONG SURVIVE AS A COMMUNITY OF FREE STATES, AND WITHOUT A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC EUROPE, THE SURVIVAL OF THE U.S. ITSELF WOULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION.

2. I POINTED OUT TO FRANK THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS IN CHICAGO ON MARCH 15 HAD BEEN MISREPRESENTED BY SOME MEDIA IN EUROPE IN ONE IMPORTANT SENSE. IT WAS NOT NOW AND NEVER HAD BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY UNILATERALLY TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM EUROPE. IT WAS, HOWEVER, EVIDENT THAT THE BEHAVIOR OF THE EUROPEAN STATES TOWARD THE U.S. WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS TO SUPPORT THAT TROOP PRESENCE, AND THE EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS COULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ASSERT HIS POLICY EFFECTIVELY, THIS WAS THE POINT WHICH HE HAD MADE IN CHICAGO, AND WHICH HE REITERATED AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE IN HOUSTON ON MARCH 19.

3. FRANK SAID THAT, IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, IT WOULD NOW BE WELL TO INTRODUCE A BREATHING SPELL INTO THE TRANS-ATLANTIC DIALOGUE. (FRANK COMMENTED IN AN AMUSED WAY THAT HE WAS KNOWN FROM THE TIME OF THE FRG'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CSSR AS A MAN WHO FAVORED BREATHING SPELLS.) THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT WE HAD TO STOP DISCUSSING OUR
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DIFFERENCES, BUT IT DID MEAN THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THEM WITHOUT A SENSE OF TIME PRESSURE. EVIDENTLY BASING HIS REMARKS ON AMBASSADOR VON STADEN'S REPORT OF HIS MARCH 16 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, FRANK SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DECIDE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE NATO DECLARATION WHILE DROPPING THE U.S.-EC DECLARATION OR INDEED TO ADOPT ANY OTHER SPECIFIC DECISION ON HOW TO PROCEED. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE CLOSE

BONDS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE HAD NOT BEEN FORGED WITH DECLARATIONS. THE MILESTONES IN THAT RELATIONSHIP WERE CONCRETE EVENTS, E.G., THE COOPERATION OF THE ALLIES DURING WORLD WAR II, THE ALLIED VICTORY OVER THE AXIS POWERS, THE BERLIN AIRLIFT, AND THE SOLUTION OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

4. FRANK PLACED CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR GREATER PRECISION AS THE BASIS FOR FULLER UNDERSTANDING BOTH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES AND AMONGST THE EC MEMBERS. HE STATED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE NECESSARY FOR THE FRG AND THE OTHER EC MEMBERS TO SPEAK IN VERY CLEAR TERMS WITH THE FRENCH AND TO DEMAND A CLARIFICATION OF FRENCH POLICY AND FRENCH INTENTIONS.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE NEED FOR CLEARER UNDERSTANDINGS, FRANK REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HE FELT AROSE ON THE OCCASION OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BONN MARCH 3-4. HE REFERRED TO FRG EFFORTS TO PERSUADE OTHER EC MEMBERS TO MODIFY THE EC DECISION ON COOPERATION WITH THE ARABS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF U.S. CONCERNS. THE GERMANS, HE SAID, HAD FELT THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED A GENUINELY GOOD RESULT BY PERSUADING THEIR EC COLLEAGUES THAT THE DECISION SHOULD NOT DEAL WITH OIL, THAT THE ENVISIONED COOPERATION SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH U.S. PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS, AND

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BONN 4497

EXDIS

THAT NO FIRM DATE SHOULD BE SET FOR A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. AND YET, THE U.S. HAD REACTED STRONGLY AND NEGATIVELY TO THE EC DECISION. NOW IT HAD EMERGED FROM THE SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR VON STADEN THAT THE SECRETARY HAD NOT SEEN EARLIER VERSIONS OF THE EC PROPOSALS AND THEREFORE HAD NOTHING AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE DECISIONS OF MARCH 4 IN ORDER TO PERCEIVE WHAT MODIFICATIONS HAD BEEN MADE. THIS, FRANK SAID, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF SITUATION WHICH WE OUGHT HENCEFORTH TO TRY TO AVOID.

6. FRANK MENTIONED THAT AMBASSADOR VON STADEN HAD OUTLINED TO THE SECRETARY CURRENT GERMAN THINKING ON THE SUBJECT OF IMPROVED CONSULTATIONS (WHICH WE HAD
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PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED FROM VAN WELL). THE THOUGHT WAS THAT EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD TRY TO COME TO A MEETING OF MINDS ON QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT TAKING A FORMAL DECISION. BEFORE EC MINISTERS PASSED ON IT, THE MATTER WOULD THEN BE DISCUSSED WITH U.S. REPS, PROBABLY BY THE EC REP CURRENTLY HOLDING THE CHAIR. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD ONLY WORK, FRANK SAID, IF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED PARTICIPATED SINCERELY IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE MUTUAL COMMUNICATION. A PART OF THIS PROCESS WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. (OR THE EUROPEANS, AS THE CASE MIGHT BE) ALSO TO TRY TO MAKE CLEAR WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE IF ITS VIEWS WERE IGNORED OR COULD NOT FOR SOME REASON BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

7. FRANK THEN WENT ON TO OUTLINE FURTHER VIEWS ON THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN DISCUSSED RECENTLY AT ONE OF HIS STAFF MEETINGS. HE FELT THAT WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT DURING PERIODS OF CRISIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE GROUND FOR FRUITFUL AND SUCCESSFUL CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE PRESSURE OF CRISES HAD TO BE PREPARED

BY PRIOR DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF SITUATIONS WHERE SUCH CRISES MIGHT ARISE. A COMMON ANALYSIS HAD BEEN LACKING WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND THERE WERE OTHER AREAS OF VITAL INTEREST TO WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. WHERE CRISES COULD OCCUR AT ANY TIME. YUGOSLAVIA WAS AN EXAMPLE. THERE WAS, SO FAR AS FRANK WAS AWARE, NO ADEQUATE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE KIND OF PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE UPON THE DEPARTURE OF TITO. IF TITO DIED TOMORROW AND THE USSR BEGAN MAKING THREATENING GESTURES A FEW HOURS LATER, WHAT KIND OF A POSITION WOULD THE WEST BE IN TO MEET THIS THREAT? AND WAS IT NOT LIKELY THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND OF A COMMON ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION THE SAME TENSIONS MIGHT ARISE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE THAT HAD OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR? THE PROBLEM, WHEN ONE LOOKED AT IT IN THIS WAY, WAS NOT SO MUCH ONE OF INSERTING THE WORD "PARTNERSHIP" INTO A DECLARATION AS IT WAS OF ACHIEVING A GENUINE SYNCHRONIZATION OF POLICY. FRANK ADDED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, SUMMIT CONFERENCES WERE NOT THE ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM. WHAT WAS SECRET

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NEEDED WAS DETAILED COORDINATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING. HE THOUGHT THAT BERLIN PROVIDED A GOOD EXAMPLE OF HOW REGULAR CONSULTATION AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING PAID OFF. BERLIN WAS ONE AREA WHERE THE U.S. AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES HAD IN FACT BEEN ABLE TO FACE WHATEVER PROBLEMS AROSE WITH A COMMON VIEW.

8. COMMENT: ON SUNDAY THE SECRETARY WILL FIND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS STATE SECRETARY IN A CHASTENED AND SOMEWHAT BEWILDERED MOOD, DETERMINED TO DO THEIR BEST TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN, BUT VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE CLUMSY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE VAGARIES OF FRENCH POLICY. SCHEEL AND FRANK SINCERELY BELIEVE THERE WAS A REAL MISUNDERSTANDING ON THEIR PART ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 3, AND THEY WILL WELCOME THE SECRETARY'S STOPOVER BOTH FOR THE OPPORTUNITY IT GIVES FOR FURTHER FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT AND AS EVIDENCE AGAINST OPPOSITION ATTACKS THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN OUR BLACK BOOK. ONE THING WHICH HAS CLEARLY EMERGED IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS IS THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT POPULAR SENTIMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN FAVOR OF CLOSE TIES WITH THE U.S., AND THE OPPOSITION HAS MOVED RAPIDLY TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS IN ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT FOR HAVING BUNGLED ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

9. THE EMBASSY HAS REPORTED IN BONN 4423 SCHEEL'S

STATEMENT IN THE BUNDESTAG IN RESPONSE TO TWO WRITTEN
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT BY THE CDU. IN
SOMEWHAT GUARDED LANGUAGE, HE EXPRESSED THE DILEMMA,
UPON WHICH THE GERMANS FIND THEMSELVES IMPALED, OF
FINDING SOME WAY OF PROVIDING ADEQUATE CONSULTATION
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND A COMMUNITY WHICH IS NEITHER
INSTITUTIONALLY, NOR IN TERMS OF FRENCH ATTITUDES,
EQUIPPED TO CONDUCT SUCH CONSULTATION. AS NOTED ABOVE,
THE GERMANS HAVE MADE SOME TENTATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH,
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY BELIEVE ARE PROBABLY THE
BEST THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE PRESENT TIME. THEY
WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INTERESTED IN THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS
AS TO THEIR ACCEPTABILITY, AT LEAST AS A BEGINNING.

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